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POLITICAL FORECAST FOR RUSSIA FROM 2020 TO 2030

Annotation. An analysis was made of the implementation of my forecast from 2005, according to which in 2015 the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will be ready to wage a big war. It is revealed that this forecast was realized by date, but not by the scale of political upheavals: the Russian people have not yet exhausted their potential for active, including bloody, actions, which, combined with the growing desire of the peoples of the Russian Federation to implement radical changes, leads to the forecast that political life in Russia in the 2020s (including emotional and military aspects) will be extremely intense: the country's territory may expand or decrease; riots, coup attempts, outbreaks of limited military conflicts are possible; it is also possible the beginning of a normal war by intensity, the adoption of a new Constitution of Russia; at the same time neither civil war nor severe bloody war is expected.

Keywords: forecasting, future, Russia, Russian Federation, conflict, war, Constitution, Russians

Forecast from 2005 [6]. In October 2005, I drew up an ethnopolitical forecast called «1. When will the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus be ready to fight a big war? 2. Why did the USSR disintegrate bloodlessly?» This forecast was based on the analysis of the internal movement of ethnic groups:

1. It is recorded that in 1922 the Civil War in Russia ended, which took place throughout the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, and in 1945, the Great Patriotic War ended, which affected part of the territories (not the entire territory, as it was during the Civil War!) the former Russian Empire.

2. It was found that the wars that broke out in the early 1990s on the territory of the former Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Transnistria) began in the regions not affected by the Great Patriotic War (with the exception of Transnistria) .

3. It is calculated that the peoples of the former Russian Empire acquired an active desire to fight after about $1990-1920=70$ years of peaceful life.

4. Three conclusions were made:

4.1. The USSR collapsed bloodlessly because the Slavic peoples in 1990 were not ready to fight, since not 70 years of peacetime passed, but only $1990-1945 = 45$ years (quote: «*An analogue of the truly "bloody" collapse of the Soviet Union is the Civil War and the military intervention in Russia in 1917-1922*»).

4.2. The Slavic peoples of the former USSR will acquire a desire to fight after about 70 years of peaceful life, that is, in $1945+70=2015$ (quote: «*For 70 years of life without a big war, most of the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia have accumulated strength for*

unforced wars, so it would be logical to assume that the Slavic states: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will accumulate similar forces after 70 years, that is, by 1945+70=2015»).

4.3. The scale of the big war, for which the Slavic peoples will be ready by 2015, is about 1 million killed and died from all military consequences; but this does not mean that such losses should be expected - there may be and more and less of them (quote: «*So, by 2015, the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will be ready for a big war, but will they be actively fighting? Maybe the peoples of these countries will enter a major war in a century - in the 2050s or in a century and a half - in the 2100s? (...) But the fact that by 2015 these peoples will have more strength is undoubtedly! And where will they direct them? To increase their well-being, to cultural life or to external aggression, and maybe all together*»).

The results of the forecast from 2005. The forecast from 2005 to the end of today, 2019, was partially realized:

1. The territory of Russia has increased due to the reunification with Crimea in 2014.
2. The military conflict in southeastern Ukraine began in 2014, the active phase of the confrontation ended in the winter of 2015, and now there are sluggish limited positional battles on the front line.

3. The main territories of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus did not suffer from the war.

4. The scale of military losses is less than ten thousand killed and died from all the consequences of the war on both sides. It is difficult to trust the figures of military losses voiced by Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk, since during the ongoing military conflict our losses are downplayed, while another are exaggerated (quote: «*They never lie so much as during the war, after the hunt and before the elections*», by Otto von Bismarck); more reliable is the figure of 3.3 thousand civilian deaths announced in the UN [9].

As you can see, the conflict in Donbass did not fully realize the desire of the Slavic peoples of the former USSR to wage a big war. This conclusion is confirmed by the outbreak of the war in Syria, in which Russia is still participating, and the incessant fighting on the fronts of the unrecognized DPR and LPR.

Conclusion № 1. The conflict in Donbass only to a small extent realized the desire of the Slavic peoples to fight. The conflict in Donbass only to a small extent realized the desire of the Slavic peoples to fight.

Present Russia or RF. The law on the consequences of a catastrophe is formulated as follows: "The catastrophe first brings to life the past, and then opens the way for the future" [5].

The USSR was a state with a communist ideology. In 1991, the Soviet Union split into separate states.

The present is socialism in the form of the USSR.

The past is Tsarist Russia and the Civil War of 1917-1921.

The future is what citizens destroyed the Soviet Union for; The USSR fell so that the former Soviet people could live «as in the West»: freely express their opinions and move around the world, hold democratic elections, earn money in a market economy and much more.

The collapse of the USSR brought to life the past - a civil war, an analogue of which are armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. Also part of the past is the rise of monarchist ideas in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

The disaster-shattered present - socialism - is trying to recover: this is precisely what the communist parties at the elections successes in the 1990s are linked to. But the present is gradually losing ground: in Russia the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is not gaining

many votes, and in Ukraine the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned in 2014, after which in 2014-2016, the country underwent a complete decommunization – in Russia, partial decommunization was carried out in the early 1990s (in particular, Leningrad was renamed to St. Petersburg, Kuibyshev to Samara, Sverdlovsk to Yekaterinburg and so on). Also, modern attempts to revive the Soviet Union or the RSFSR are: the anthem of Russia, similar in music to the anthem of the USSR, the growing popularity of communist leaders and ideas, the desire to create in Russia a community of Russians, that is, people without ethnicities, the analogue of which was the Soviet people, and much more.

Conclusion № 2. The modern state Russia or the Russian Federation, in accordance with the law on the consequences of the catastrophe, is an intermediate construction between the present, which is trying to revive in the form of a second version of the USSR, the remnants of the past and elements of a future that has not yet come (a kind of «new Russia»).

Changes in Russia. From 2017 to 2019, there has been an increase in the number of citizens in Russia who want decisive and full-scale changes: in July 2017 there were 42% of such people, and in July 2019 it was 59% [1].

Russians of Russia. Russians are the majority in Russia: 112.5 million Russians live in the country [3] with a population of 146.9 million at the end of 2017. [2], that is, about 76% of Russians live in the modern Russian Federation.

Conclusion № 3. The modern population of Russia is ready for active and radical changes on the one hand and wants them to be carried out on the other.

Conclusion № 4. The main driving force behind the upcoming changes in Russia is the internal needs of the Russian ethnos.

Political forecast for Russia for the period from 2020 to 2030.

Most likely, the most radical and difficult changes await Russia in the first half of the 2020s, and in general, the entire next ten years (and possibly the 2030s-2040s) will be marked by radical changes.

In the 2020s, Russia expects the implementation of several (not one, but not all!) Political events: an armed mutiny, an attempted coup, the adoption of a new Constitution, an attempt to secede territories from Russia, an attempt to expand the territory of Russia, a small military conflict (with the number casualties from all consequences of the war to several tens of thousands of people), ordinary war (with the number of victims from all consequences of the war of the order of several hundred thousand people).

An important addition: the implementation of one of the political events does not mean that it is one-off, that is, there may be several attempts to secede territories from Russia, several attempts to increase the territory of Russia, several separate limited armed conflicts, and so on.

There are also two risks, the realization of which looks minimal - a civil war in Russia and a bloody war unleashed by Russia.

Risk № 1. A hundred years ago, there was already a civil war in Russia, which, today, is the bloodiest war in the history of mankind, both in terms of the total number of losses and the average number of daily losses (total number of deaths and deaths from all the consequences of the war - 10.5 million people, the average speed of bloodshed is 5700 people daily irrecoverable losses) [8], so it is unlikely that in the 2020s the peoples of Russia will repeat this past horror.

Risk № 2. The unleashing of a bloody war by Russia looks unlikely, because memories of the colossal losses in the Civil War of 1917-1922 and during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 are still fresh in the memory of the peoples.

Remark № 1. The difference between a small conflict, an ordinary war and a bloody war lies in the size of mobilization and, as a result, the number of losses and the scale of destruction. 0.05% of the country's population participates in a small conflict, 0.5-1% of the country's population in a conventional war, but 8-15% of the country's population takes part in a bloody war, sometimes up to 20-25% [4]. In relation to this forecast, a small conflict and a conventional war look likely for Russia.

Remark № 2. If during the 2020-2030s an ordinary war occurs, in which Russia becomes involved (as an initiator or forcedly), then it will be possible to say that my forecast for 2005 has come true completely.

Russians of Russia are ready and willing to show high activity associated with the risk to their lives in the direction of radical changes - where will their activity lead Russia? Time will tell.

Remark № 3. Contemporary Russia has no image of the future. At the same time, there is a historical basis for the fact that the "new Russia", which may appear as a result of the conflicts of the 2020s, will look like this: the name of the country - the Russian Republic or Russia, the state motto - For Faith, Motherland and Freedom, state the device is a territorial federation, plus there is a possibility that the Russian people will accept approximately the following national idea: Orthodoxy, religious tolerance, democracy, personal success [7].

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